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I Articles I
The Rhetoric of Colorblind
Constitutionalism: Individualism, Race and
Public Schools in Louisville, Kentucky
Enid Trucios-Haynes* and Cedric Merlin
Powell**
I. Introduction
Only three years after the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of
Education,' the United States Supreme Court decided the
constitutionality of two voluntary school integration plans in Louisville,
* Professor of Law, Brandeis School of Law at the University of Louisville. B.A.,
City University of New York (Queens College); J.D., Stanford Law School. Professor
Trucios-Haynes' son attends school in the Jefferson County Public School system. This
Article is based on a presentation at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools, Community, Diversity and Equal Protection: The Louisville and
Seattle School Cases sponsored by the Section on Law and Communitarian Studies and
co-sponsored by the Sections on Civil Rights and Minority Groups. Special thanks to
Robert Ackerman for the invitation to speak at the AALS Conference, Cedric M. Powell
and Claire Parsons, my research assistant.
** Professor of Law, Brandeis School of Law at the University of Louisville. B.A.,
Oberlin College; J.D., New York University School of Law. Professor Powell's son
attends public school in Jefferson County, Louisville, Kentucky. Special thanks to my
colleague, Enid Trucios-Haynes, for inviting me to co-author this Article with her.
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Kentucky and Seattle, Washington.2 This landmark decision marks the
beginning of the Roberts Court's race jurisprudence. The opinion, and
the debate surrounding it, illustrates the dominance of neutral themes in
the Court's jurisprudence and the political landscape. The narrative
structure of the Court's race cases is rooted in Rhetorical Neutrality, 3 a
middle ground approach that privileges individualism over the
substantive claims of historically oppressed groups. 4  Adopting
colorblind constitutionalism, the Court chooses a conception of equality
that is internally inconsistent. Race is viewed skeptically and positively
at the same time. Specifically, individuals should not be discriminated
against because of a difference in their race, but differences in race in the
form of racial diversity should be embraced because it is a compelling
interest in the educational and social marketplacef By including all
differences in the quest for educational pluralism, diversity becomes an
arbitrary litmus test for inclusion or exclusion.
Thus, the Court draws a bright-line that separates secondary schools
from post-secondary schools: race-based school assignments "are not
governed by Grutter."6 The Court has turned inside-out the local control
(deferential) rationale that was the linchpin of its school jurisprudence.
7
The Court undertakes a colorblind crusade without reference to the
continuing effects of past discrimination. In fact, the Court has never
viewed local control as an inherently "good" institutional goal-its
jurisprudence from the mid-70s through the 1990s evinces either an
eagerness to get out of the "school desegregation business,', 8 or an
2. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1-Meredith v. Jefferson
County. Bd. of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
3. Cedric Merlin Powell, Rhetorical Neutrality: Colorblindness, Frederick
Douglass, and Inverted Critical Race Theory, 56 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
4. Id. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race ":
The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003
U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 698 (2003).
5. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (O'Connor, J.) ("Just as
growing up in a particular region or having particular professional experiences is likely to
affect an individual's views, so too is one's own, unique experience of being a racial
minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still matters."); Scott
Cummings, Affirmative Action and the Rhetoric of Individual Rights: Reclaiming
Liberalism as a "Color Conscious" Theory, 13 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 183, 187
(1997) (describing liberal individualism as the doctrinal basis for colorblind
constitutionalism).
6. Parents Involved-Meredith, 127 S. Ct. at 2754.
7. Id. at 2752-61.
8. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (interdistrict remedy of
increased spending to bring whites into the school district was invalid in the absence of
an interdistrict violation); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (the federal courts
should return supervisory control to local authorities as soon as possible; indeed, federal
control may be withdrawn completely or partially based on good-faith compliance with
the desegregation decree); Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250
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attempt to explain the "natural" consequences of irremediable societal
discrimination. 9 This is why the constitutionalization of individual
choice to attend neighborhood schools, as a doctrinal proposition, is so
attractive to the Court in Parents Involved-Meredith.
Seattle too has struggled with its integration efforts and disputes
between its local decision-makers, in the form of the city school board,
and the larger voting public. We saw this dynamic in the case
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, decided by the Supreme
Court in 1982.1° Louisville has also grappled with integration plans and
(1991) (based on good faith finding of compliance, a district court may dissolve a
desegregation order where the vestiges of de jure segregation had been eradicated "to the
extent praticable."); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976)
(stressing a temporal limit on federal court intervention, the Court concluded that once a
court implemented a racially neutral attendance plan, in the absence of intentional
racially discriminatory actions by the school board, the court could not adjust its
desegregation order to address population shifts in the school district); Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (interdistrict remedies must be specifically tailored to
address interdistrict violations).
In a succession of sharply divided opinions issued in 1991, 1992, and 1995,
Chief Justice Rehnquist invested "local control" of schooling with a
constitutional weight that counterbalanced the earlier Warren Court's concern
for racial discrimination and educational injury.... Collectively, these
decisions "send [the] unmistakable [message] that district courts should begin
winding up the process of desegregation. ... Most commentators agree that the
unfortunate, but predicted, effect of these decisions was the commencement of
a significant trend toward resegregation."
Boyce F. Martin, Jr., Symposium: Promises to Keep?: Brown v. Board and Equal
Educational Opportunity, Fifty Years Later, It's Time to Mend Brown's Broken Promise,
2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 1203, 1210-11(2004).
9. "The Supreme Court has evidenced its desire that school desegregation orders
end now, even if disparities remain and even if immediate resegregation will follow
termination of the lawsuit." Wendy Parker, Symposium, The Resegregation of Southern
Schools? A Crucial Moment in the History (and the Future) of Public Schooling in
America, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1645 (2003).
10. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (holding that
Initiative 350, an anti-desegregation ballot initiative, violated the Equal Protection Clause
because school boards have broad power to use race to integrate schools). As Professor
Kevin Brown observes:
The Supreme Court held that Initiative 350 violated the Equal Protection
Clause. The Court noted that Initiative 350 removed from the local school
board only the power to assign students to schools based on race, stating:
[T]he power to determine what programs would most appropriately fill a
school district's educational needs-including programs involving student
assignment and desegregation-was firmly committed to the local board's
discretion. The question whether to provide an integrated learning
environment rather than a system of neighborhood schools surely involved
a decision of that sort.
Thus, the Court left Seattle with a school desegregation program that exceeded
that which could be ordered by federal district courts, even if it was necessary
to remedy an equal protection violation.
Kevin Brown, The Constitutionality of Racial Classifications in Public School
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fissures in community support prior to the Parents Involved-Meredith
decision. The Louisville situation is further distinguished from many
school districts facing choices about integration efforts. In 1998,
African-American parents in Louisville sued to dissolve the existing
desegregation decree and to obtain the perceived educational benefit of
access to a neighborhood high school." The District Court granted this
relief in Hampton v. Jefferson County Board of Education.2 The
African-American community was divided about the benefits of the
school district's integration plan, and this division became the
justification for the recent challenges to the Jefferson County School
Board student assignment plan.'
3
Hampton v. Jefferson County Board of Education14 and McFarland
v. Jefferson County Public Schools'5 stand in stark contrast to each other
and underscore the doctrinal and political tensions on the ground in
Louisville. McFarland is the lower court decision that would reach the
Court as Parents Involved-Meredith. In McFarland, white parents
asserted the right of their children to attend neighborhood schools and
challenged the constitutionality of the school assignment program.'
6
Hampton attempts to balance liberal individualism-the individual right
of African-American school students to attend a magnet school-and the
political community's commitment to integrated schools. 17 It is ironic
that the assertion of this individualized right comes from African-
American parents, members of a discrete and insular minority.' 8 These
parents adopt a colorblind approach to individual school choice, an
approach that would prove particularly attractive to the Court in Parents
Involved-Meredith. This approach is contrary to the community's
endorsement of substantive diversity and integration. McFarland, a case
granted certiori by the United States Supreme Court in 2006, embraces
Admissions, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 10 (2000). The Court explicitly ignored this broad
conception of school board power and deference to local decision making in Parents
Involved-Meredith. See, e.g., Parents Involved-Meredith, 127 S. Ct. at 2805, 2830-31
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
11. Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp.2d 358 (W.D. Ky.
2000).
12. Id.
13. Michael Jennings & Veda Morgan, Integration-At What Price?, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), June 13, 1999.
14. Id.
15. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp.2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2004),
aff'd., 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub. nom Meredith v. Jefferson County.
Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006). Meredith joined a pending lawsuit; the other
underlying issues relating to McFarland were no longer at issue when the case ultimately
reached the United States Supreme Court.
16. Id. at 837-39.
17. Hampton, 102 F. Supp.2d at 376-82.
18. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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the will of the political community to voluntarily integrate schools by
emphasizing the rationales of local control and institutional deference.' 9
Adopting colorblind constitutionalism, the United States Supreme Court
casts aside the will of the political community and invalidates the
voluntary integration plans of the Louisville and Seattle school
20 Vw fromdistricts . Vieweduro the ground, this result was inevitable.
19. McFarland, 330 F. Supp.2d at 850-55.
20. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1-Meredith v. Jefferson
County. Bd. of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007) (reversing and stating that "[t]he way
to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.").
2008]
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II. How Community Opinion is Shaped Through the Rhetoric of
Individualism in Challenges to Voluntary Desegregation in
Louisville, Kentucky
A. The First Case-Hampton v. Jefferson County Board of Education
21
In Hampton, the traditional roles of parties in desegregation
litigation were reversed: instead of African-American plaintiffs suing to
preserve the desegregation decree's mandate to fully integrate the school
system, they moved to dissolve the decree arguing that it had "outlasted
its utility."22 The school board, instead of arguing to be released from its
affirmative duty under the decree to ensure that students attended an
integrated school system, contended that the demographic vestiges of the
formerly de jure segregated system precluded dissolution of the decree.23
There is a certain inevitability about the plaintiffs' claim-the formerly
injured parties are now asserting a claim from "relief'-since there is no
identifiable discrimination to remedy, so a race-conscious remedy is
inherently suspect and constitutionally invalid. 4
Pursuit of the integration ideal in the Jefferson County public
schools has always been contingent on the support of the local African-
American community. At the time of the 1971 suit establishing the
existence of a dual school system in Louisville-Jefferson County and the
need for judicial supervision of student assignment, the African-
American student population was a very small percentage of the total
21. Id.
22. Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp.2d 358, 363 (W.D. Ky.
2000). "[U]sually, it is the school board trying to shed its obligations under a
desegregation order... [n]ever before have the plaintiffs been African-Americans, for
whose supposed benefit such decrees were entered." Id. at 359.
23. Id. at 363 (stating "[t]he Intervenors join the Defendants in this demographic
argument, but also submit that other racial imbalances in the school system refute
compliance, belie good faith, and constitute remediable vestiges of the de jure
violation"). Citing a lack of a causal connection between the Intervenors' claims of
societal discrimination and current vestiges of discrimination in the school system, the
court rejected their argument: "Though the Intervenors raised many thought-provoking
educational issues, none is of constitutional significance." Id.
24. This leads to the inevitable result in Parents Involved-Meredith. Hampton sets
the stage: It is much easier for the Court to advance its disturbing rationale that
discrimination no longer exists in the wake of a previously successful challenge,
advanced by African-American parents, which embraced liberal individualism and
colorblind constitutionalism. Since there was no de jure discrimination to eradicate, the
voluntary integration program of the Jefferson County Public Schools was
constitutionally invalid. The Court also rejected the diversity rationale as inapplicable in
the elementary and secondary school context. See Parents Involved-Meredith, 127 S. Ct.
at 2752-55.
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student body. 25 The support of African-American parents, local civil
rights leaders, and other leaders in the African-American community was
a key factor in the 1971 case.26 The Sixth Circuit explicitly referred to
the agreement of the African-American plaintiffs in the integration
plan.27
The turmoil of desegregation in 1975 also resonates in the concerns
expressed by parents in the 1990s leading up to the Hampton case.
Lawsuits filed by the Kentucky Civil Liberties Union, Legal Aid Society
and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) in 1971 and 1972 identified a dual system of education in the
city of Louisville, in Jefferson County and in the city of Anchorage. 28 A
district court order required a merger of the Louisville and Jefferson
county districts and an integration plan using busing was implemented in
1975.29 The integration plan and mandatory busing have been described
as "sparking one of the most divisive periods in the city's history"...
"stir[ing] racial acrimony, and sometimes violence."30 Photographs from
those early days of busing in Louisville won a Pulitzer Prize for
journalists with the local paper, The Courier Journal.
31
The constitutionalization of individual choice to attend
neighborhood schools was inevitable when members of the local
African-American community voiced their opposition. Disillusioned
members of Louisville's African-American community opposed the
district's integration efforts because of the continuing racial gap in
educational achievement.32 The question of which community, black or
white, bears the disproportionate burden of integration through busing
25. Robert A. Sedler, The Louisville-Jefferson County School Desegregation Case:
A Lawyer's Retrospective, 105 REGISTER OF THE Ky. HISTORICAL Soc'Y 3, 6 (2007). In
1971 there were nearly 96,000 students of which only four percent were African-
American. The school district contained 74 elementary schools, but the majority of
African-American elementary students were in 3 schools, one of which had been an all
black school before 1954 and had continued to operate as an all black school until 1971.
In Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Education of Jefferson County, 489 F.2d 925,
929 (6th Cir. 1971), this state of affairs was a key fact in the determination that Louisville
continued to operate a dual school system, id.
26. Sedler, supra note 25, at 6. The pursuit of the integration ideal in the 1971
lawsuit was supported by African-American community leaders and African-American
parents. Id. The plaintiffs in the consolidated cases intentionally included both white and
African-American parents. Id.
27. Id. (citing Cunningham v. Grayson, 541 F.2d 538, 542 (6th Cir. 1976)).
28. Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973),
vacated, 418 U.S. 918 (1974), reinstated, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974).
29. Id.
30. Marcus Wohlsen, Busing's Legacy; Controversy Lingers 30 Years Later; Hurt
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was an issue in the 1971 lawsuit to end the dual school system33 and
again throughout the 1990s. The opposition to busing, to the extent it
limits the access of African-American students to neighborhood schools,
has been recast in colorblind terms as a challenge to the use of race at all
in student assignments.
In the 1990s, the student assignment limits on African-American
enrollment in Central High School were seen by many in the African-
American community as one more flaw with the district's integration
plan that had not addressed achievement gaps.34 Given continuing
patterns of residential segregation in Louisville, the denial of admission
to the historically African-American high school that would also be their
neighborhood school for many in the African-American community, was
especially troublesome.
In Hampton, a group of African-American students were denied
admission to the Central High Magnet Career Academy ("Central");
35
their parents brought suit challenging the race-conscious selection
process to the Academy and petitioning for the dissolution of a
desegregation decree which had been in place for twenty-five years.36
Central had no specified geographic attendance base: "all of its students
apply for and participate in one of four special magnet programs-
business, law and government, computer technology, and medicine. 37
The racial composition of Central was fifty-percent African-American
students while its enrollment was "about 300 or 400 students below
capacity. '38 Fifty-percent is the upper limit of the racial guidelines set
forth in the student assignment plan;39 the African-American students
were denied admission because to do so would alter the racial balance of
Central. "To keep enrollment within the racial guideline, JCPS will not
admit any more African-American students unless it also attracts an
33. Sedler, supra note 25, at 23.
34. Michael Jennings, Schools' Integration Tested, Suit Challenges Limit on Blacks
at Central High, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Apr. 13, 1999, at IA.
35. Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp.2d 358, 377 (W.D. Ky.
2000); Robert A. Sedler, Symposium, Implementing Brown: A Lawyer's View, 50 WAYNE
L. REV. 835, 840 (2004) (Central High School was "Louisville's pre-Brown African-
American high school."); see Scdler, supra note 25, at 3 (for a detailed history of
desegregation litigation in Louisville: "While there was intense opposition to the
desegregation plan at the time, necessitating enforcement by federal marshals and the
call-up of the Kentucky National Guard in September 1975, it was not long before the
plan gained a degree of community acceptance.").
36. Hampton, 102 F. Supp.2d at 377.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. The plan set a range of between fifteen-percent and fifty-percent. Id. at 364.
Thus, the African-American student population could not go below fifteen-percent or
above fifty-percent.
[Vol. 112:4
THE RHETORIC OF COLORBLIND CONSTITUTIONALISM
equal number of non-black students., 40 According to local news reports,
in 1998, when the Hampton suit began, Central High School could
accommodate 1,400 students but only 915 students were admitted.4'
Under the district's assignment plan, additional African-American
students could be enrolled only if more white students were enrolled in
the magnet high school.42
The problem with the student assignment policy for some in the
African-American community was the impact on African-American
students living close to Central High School. In 1996, the plaintiffs in
the Hampton case formed an organization, CEASE, comprised primarily
of parents who had attended Central High School.4 3 The group argued
throughout the 1990's that the student assignment plan, limiting
enrollment in Central High School, discriminated against African-
American students.44 The local newspaper reported that, "racial quotas
are the main reason for the high rejection rate for blacks at Central [High
School]." 45  This continued opposition from some in the African
American community occurred despite regular recognition of the
district's integration achievements. The fact that Jefferson County was
one of the most integrated school systems in the United States was a
regular feature in news reports.46
The parents in the Hampton case, using the rhetoric of racial
discrimination but adopting a colorblind theory for their case, proclaimed
the need for a majority African-American high school so their children
could attend a neighborhood school. Members of the CEASE
organization acknowledged that the dissolution of the desegregation
decree could lead to resegregation of the school system.47
The possibility of the school system being resegregated was
anticipated by the parents. The idea that a majority African-American
school would violate the assignment plan, but that a majority white
school would not be sanctioned was particularly disturbing for members
40. Id.
41. Jennings, supra note 34, at IA.
42. Hampton, 102 F. Supp.2d at 377.
43. Chris Poynter, School Desegregation: Court Decree Dissolved, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), June 21, 2000, at 08A. CEASE is an acronym for Citizens for
Equitable Assignment to School Environment, a group that had "been complaining for
years that the admissions policy at Central High School discriminated against black
students." Id.
44. Id.
45. Michael Jennings, Schools' Integration Tested; Suit Challenges Limit on Blacks
at Central High, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Apr. 13, 1999, at 01 A.
46. Id.
47. Poynter, supra note 43, at 08A (As one CEASE member noted, "Our desire was
to never have this system resegregated.... If that is a consequence of this order, so be it.
But that was not our intent.").
2008]
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of the CEASE group.48 The dispute with the local school board was
personal; members referred to the superintendent as incompetent and
school board members as negligent for not admitting more African-
American students to Central High School.
49
News accounts in 1999 reported on the division among African-
Americans regarding desegregation efforts by the Jefferson County
School Board.50 One news report commented on the change in African-
American support.51 The lawsuit to dissolve the desegregation decree
risked "schools' [sic] becoming less integrated," representing a
significant shift of the community from the 1970's when "civil-rights
advocates almost unanimously supported school desegregation.,
52
The fact that the plaintiffs were African-American heightened the
discord created by the lawsuit. Shelby Lanier, former president of the
Louisville branch of the NAACP said that, "the [desegregation] decree
has produced no educational benefits for African-American children, so
he would have no difficulty parting with it now." 53  He called the
Jefferson County system "the most segregated so-called integrated
system," because white students were admitted to desirable programs and
African-Americans were directed to lower performing programs or
tracks.54
Still, others in the African-American community supported the
integration plan. A local civil-rights activist from the 1970's and former
NAACP attorney was reported not to want to dissolve the desegregation
decree.55 The newspaper noted that the differences among NAACP
members "may presage a battle within the organization over whether
to... terminate the desegregation decree.
56
The Intervenors in the Hampton case also illustrated the division
within the local African-American community. The intervenor group
included four parents and one grandparent of Central High School
students. 57 They wanted to continue the school assignment plan, as well
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Michael Jennings & Veda Morgan, Integration-At What Price?; Civil-rights
Leaders Now Divided, COURLER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), June 13, 1999, at 01A.
51. Jim Adams, School Decree Dissolved; Order Creates Uncertainty for Jefferson
District, Race Can Still Be Factor of Admission, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), June 21,
2000, at 01A.





57. Michael Jennings, Central High School; Parents See Chance to Put Suit on
Firmer Legal Footing, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), June 11, 1999 ("Historically,
Central [High School] was one of the places black Louisvillians were admitted for a high
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as require more strenuous efforts to increase the benefits of integration
throughout the district. For example, they suggested, the district could
make a special effort to increase white enrollment at Central High School
in order to increase African-American enrollment. 8
The district court dissolved the desegregation decree, concluding
that "[t]o the greatest extent practicable, the Decree has eliminated the
vestiges associated with the former policy of segregation and its
pernicious effects., 59 The court also held that the use of racial quotas in
the Central High School admission process violated the Equal Protection
Clause.60
While acknowledging that school boards, as democratically-elected
representational bodies of the community, have the power to use race in
constitutionally permissible ways, 61 the Court nevertheless rejected all of
the School Board's and Intervenors' arguments. 62  Evaluating the
plaintiffs' petition for dissolution in terms of good faith compliance
(process) and whether de jure segregation had been eliminated to the
extent practicable (outcome), the court held that there were no vestiges of
prior discrimination.63 Concluding that societal discrimination is too
illusory to serve as a remedial basis to leave the decree in place, the court
found no intentional discrimination that was directly attributable to the
School Board.64 Turning to the School Board's affirmative duty to
school education. The school retains a special place in the affections of the city's
African-American community.").
58. Id.




62. Id. at 363-69; id. at 369-76.
63. Id. at 363-69.
64. Concluding that there was no causal connection between the former de jure-
segregated school system and other racial imbalances proffered by the Intervenors, the
court held that: general societal discrimination cannot be remedied by the Decree, id. at
364; the general allegation of "institutional racism" was insufficient to prevent
dissolution of a desegregation decree, id.; the Constitution does not require a specific
level of integration in the classroom, id.; there was no evidence that the disproportionate
number of suspensions of African-American students "were the result of discrimination,
much less that they are a vestige of the old dual systems," id. at 365 n. 11; there was no
evidence presented that the achievement gap between Blacks and Whites was a remnant
of de jure segregation, id. at 365-67; there was no evidence presented that the low
numbers of African-American students in Advanced Placement classes was a vestige of
de jure segregation, id. at 367-68; and there was no evidence that racial imbalances in the
assignment of teachers and administrative staff was "caused by de jure segregation," id.
at 368-69. The court also rejected the role model theory advanced by the Intervenors.
"Carried to its logical extreme, the idea that black students are better off with black
teachers could lead to the very system the Court rejected in Brown v. Board of
Education." Id. at 369 n.26 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275-
76 (1986)). Essentially, the court held that, in the absence of particularized evidence of
2008]
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eliminate dual school systems "root and branch, 65 the court noted that
"Jefferson County is nationally acknowledged as one of the most
thorough and successful desegregation plans in the nation. ,66 On the
record, the court found good faith compliance easily established.67
Cataloguing the Board's integration efforts over the last twenty-five
years and noting that it "continued [its] commitment even after it was
unclear whether Supreme Court precedent or the Decree required it,"
68
the court stated that "JCPS has set an example for this community. 69
Noting that there was "overwhelming evidence of the Board's good faith
compliance," 70 the court concluded that "[t]he Board has extinguished
"root and branch" those institutional attitudes which enabled the former
dual systems and their accompanying policies and practices.",71 The
"root and branch" language is significant because the court is
acknowledging that the Board met the constitutional mandate of Green.72
The court then addressed the heart of the Board's argument to
preserve the Decree: if the Decree was dissolved, then the schools would
begin to "resegregate. ' '73 Here, the Court made an interesting distinction
between "resegregation," which it viewed as an "improper and
misleading ' 74 term, and the "latent demographic imbalance" that is
somewhat "natural" because it is non-intentional. 75 "Segregation is the
conscious, deliberate act of separating people by race. A return of some
schools to an African-American majority because of a certain racial
demography could be a vestige of the former segregation, but it is not an
act of segregation itself ,76 This is quite an interesting doctrinal twist on
the present day effects of past discrimination-there may be vestiges of
intentional discrimination by the state, societal discrimination is too amorphous to
remedy. Id. at 364 n.7 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504
(1989)). Since all of these stark disparities had explainable non-intentional or "neutral"
causes, the court stated that '[e]nshrined in the Constitution is the promise of equal
opportunity, not equal outcome." Id. at 367 (citation omitted).
65. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
66. Hampton, 102 F. Supp.2d at 369.
67. Id. at 369-70.
68. Id. at 370.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. This conclusion is central to Chief Justice Roberts' plurality opinion in
Parents Involved-Meredith. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1-Meredith v. Jefferson County. Bd. of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 2752 (2007) ("Once Jefferson
County achieved unitary status, it has remedied the constitutional wrong that allowed
race-based assignments. Any continued use of race must be justified on some other
basis.").
72. Hampton, 102 F. Supp.2d at 361.
73. Id. at 37.
74. Idat 371 n.28.
75. Id.
76. Id (emphasis added).
[Vol. 112:4
THE RHETORIC OF COLORBLIND CONSTITUTIONALISM
the de jure segregated school system, but these vestiges are unintentional
and irremediable. These "vestiges" are merely manifestations of societal
discrimination. Thus, the court squarely rejects the Board's argument
that it is being "responsive to the people of this community who elected
them ... to continue a fully integrated school system."77
Racial imbalance, then, was neither the product of intentional state
action nor was it directly traceable to that former racist regime; the
,'vestige" of racial imbalance in the schools was "not an act of
segregation itself."'78  While segregated housing patterns exacerbate
racial imbalance in the schools, 79 there was no causal connection
between segregated housing, racial imbalance in the schools, and
intentional state action. The court concluded that "there is not now, nor
has there ever been, any evidence that JCPS directly caused the racially
imbalanced housing patterns in Jefferson County." 80 Thus, the "[c]ourt
is confronted with a troubling disjunction between the consequence of
the burden of proof and the actual, historical record. 81
This "troubling disjunction" underscores the inevitability of success
inherent in colorblind claims:
82
The resulting full-scale analysis of the school system is no easy task
because it requires an examination not just of process-whether the
terms of the decree were fulfilled-but with outcome-whether
compliance with the decree was successful in its goals. To the extent
segregation remains, that segregation must be explained and be found
legally justifiable. The desegregation of schools, to the extent
practicable, includes the expectation of the unitary status standards
and also what plaintiffs seek through the litigation. In other words,
the standards center onfulfilling the rights of the plaintiffs.
Critically, ambiguity in the test for unitary status exists. The judicial
discretion required by the Supreme Court's standards is universally
recognized. Today, the most difficult issue presented is causation.
Defendants have the responsibility for redressing only the portion of
77. Id. n.30.
78. Id. n.28.
79. Id. at 374.
80. Id. at 372.
81. Id.
82. Here, it is ironic that African-Americans advanced the colorblind claim and that
they put on no proof "that nothing links [the racial imbalances] to the earlier
constitutional violation." Id. n.31. Rather, it is the Board's good faith compliance that
accomplished the goals of eradicating segregated schools and assuring that they never
returned. Id. at 373. It is irrelevant that the Board itself argued against the Decree.
"After all, even school districts protesting unitary status are still declared unitary."
Parker, supra note 9, at 1645. The reemergence of segregated schools is beyond the
scope of the Decree. Id. at 373-76.
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present day vestiges (which loosely translates to racial and ethnic
disparities) that are attributable to the defendants' illegal actions.
Thus, plaintiffs are entitled to their ultimate goal in the lawsuit-
desegregation to the extent practicable-but only to the extent that
current segregation is attributable to the defendants.... [N]o one
knows the extent of this relationship, not even social scientists who
study these concerns. No one can tell us how integrated our schools
would be or how students would score on achievement tests in the
absence of defendants' illegal actions. Courts are directed to
determine to what extent defendants are responsible, but the answer
is unknowable. The ambiguity in standards allows, actually even
requires, choice. The Supreme Court's own choices indicate a
willingness to believe that present inequities are not due to
defendants' illegality. Thus, the Court has excused segregated
schools on the grounds of purely private housing choices and racial
disparities in achievement scores for the reason of non-defendant
causation.8 3
The facts of Hampton are particularly compelling in this regard
because the positions are reversed. The plaintiffs, African-American
parents, want the Decree dissolved because it has "outlived" its
usefulness in maintaining integration.84 It interferes with their individual
choice. The Board, however, contends that removing the Decree will
lead to resegregation; the plaintiffs win because the court concluded that
the "present inequities [were] not due to the [Board's] illegality. 85 This
is a presumption that underlies the court's analysis-"the award of
unitary status seems almost guaranteed.... ,86 A number of Supreme
Court rationales support this proposition, and the Hampton court readily
embraces a number of these decisions. The Hampton court concluded
that: there was no constitutional requirement of demographic
integration;8 7 there was no suggestion that "continuation of the Decree
has a realistic chance of achieving demographic integration";88 "to the
extent practicable" means that there is a reasonable temporal limit on
federal court supervision; 89 and the "re-emergence of majority-black
schools will not revive a message of racial inferiority from the pre-1975
school systems."
90
83. Parker, surpa note 9, at 1646-47.
84. Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Ed., 102 F. Supp.2d at 363.
85. Parker, supra note 9, at 1647.
86. Id. at 1645.
87. Hampton, 102 F. Supp.2d at 373.
88. Id. at 374.
89. Id. "The evidence in fact indicated that no desegregation decree has had the
effect of eliminating residential segregation anywhere in America." Id. at 374-75.
90. Id. at 376.
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In dissolving the Decree, the court stated:
After twenty-five years this [c]ourt concludes that the Decree has
profoundly succeeded in those purposes. Confronted with the
complete disappearance of de jure discrimination, the
impracticability that any further Board policy will appreciably change
our racial demography, vibrant democratic debate about educational
policy, and decades of good faith on the part of the Board, the Court
concludes that JCPS should be free to adopt its student assignment
plans without the dictates of a continuing Decree.
91
Since there was no official discrimination to remedy, any race-conscious
remedial measure would be viewed skeptically by the court.92 The court
held that the two-track assignment system at Central was
unconstitutional because it focused exclusively on race to attain
educational diversity: "Without any doubt.., the current student
assignment method for Central-which fixates only on race-does not
satisfy any diversity analysis and must be stopped. 93
Like the admission program held unconstitutional in Regents of
University of California v. Bakke,94 the Central magnet career program
had vertical effects;95 African- American students could not enroll in the
magnet program offered exclusively at Central because of their race.96
There was something more than a basic education offered at Central;
97
thus, the denial of this benefit was unconstitutional. In this way, the
court equates invidious discrimination with positive, race-conscious
remedial approaches to maintain integrated schools beyond the
eradication of formal de jure segregation. "The court's holding in
Hampton might be understood simply as an application of the Supreme
Court's 'color-blind' equal protection jurisprudence; the court's
reasoning, however, suggests a failure to appreciate the difference
between state-enforced segregation which cannot help but be
stigmatizing, and voluntary separation, which perhaps cannot be
stigmatizing at all." 98
The court's colorblind approach to the Central assignment program
skews the analysis of "benefits" and "burdens" under the Equal
91. Id. at 377.
92. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
93. Hampton, 102 F. Supp.2d at 379.
94. Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
95. Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 381.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 380 (noting that when the same educational benefit is offered at each
school, then "assignment to one or another is basically fungible," so race can be used
because assignment "imposes no burden and confers no benefit.").
98. Dora W. Klein, Beyond Brown v. Board of Education: The Need to Remedy the
Achievement Gap, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 431, 454 (2002).
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Protection Clause-benefits and burdens are defined narrowly in terms
of their impact on the individual.99  This highlights the virtual
inevitability of these colorblind reverse discrimination claims;' 00 once the
desegregation decree is dissolved, the fifteen to fifty-percent student
assignment guidelines are subject to strict scrutiny.' 0' Notwithstanding
the rationale that strict scrutiny is "not strict in theory, but fatal in
fact,, ' 02 it is a short step to invalidate the Central plan once the Decree is
dissolved:
Central has two admissions tracks: one exclusively for blacks, and
another for everyone else. For African-American applicants,
"diversity" at Central means nothing more than racial composition in
relation to capacity. JCPS does not assign students at Central based
on their academic success, sex, socio-economic background, family
background, extra-curricular interest, life experiences, or the myriad
other educational or cultural axes too numerous and subjective for the
[c]ourt to devise. For many applicants, only race matters. To JCPS,
a student is either "black" or "other." While that "two-track" system
may have been appropriate (indeed, crucial) for desegregating the
school system, under Supreme Court precedent it is much too narrow
to support the interest of educational diversity. 1
03
99. Hampton, 102 F. Supp.2d at 380-8 1. Critiquing the Hampton court's reliance on
vertical rewards-the proposition that benefits and burdens should be dispersed in a
colorblind manner when the school is unique in its course offerings-Professor Julie
Mead concludes:
In essence, [magnet programs] reward parents and their children for their
willingness to enroll the child in an integrated setting, even if the parents have
other reasons for doing so. The reward is either the ability to make a choice
of schools (inter- and intra-district choice programs) or the choice coupled with
a particular instructional focus (magnet school programs).
In Hampton, Judge Heybum's understanding of vertical rewards neglects
this grounding in the program's purpose. He also misinterprets the importance
of the lack of "fungibility" between magnet schools and more traditional
schools. While it is true that magnet schools adopt methodologies and content
concentrations that mark them as unique to attract their students, the differences
are relative, not absolute as they are in the higher educational setting. In fact,
much of the curriculum and the targeted outcomes from one school to the next
are comparable.
Julie F. Mead, Conscious Use of Race as a Voluntary Means to Educational Ends in
Elementary and Secondary Education: A legal Argument Derived from Recent Judicial
Opinion, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 111 (2002).
100. The claim here is no less a reverse discrimination claim notwithstanding the fact
that it was brought by African-Americans. Not only are the roles reversed, but the
African-Americans advance a colorblind claim premised on liberal individualism to
supplant the political will of the community. This technique of inversion is part and
parcel of colorblind constitutionalism.
101. Hampton, 102 F. Supp.2d at 377-78.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 378-79. Chief Justice Roberts would use this proposition as a starting
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Hampton is essentially three opinions in one: an opinion declaring
the Central program unconstitutional; an opinion articulating the
doctrinal parameters of local control in school desegregation cases; and
an opinion which leaves open the question of the use of race in
traditional schools.
10 4
What is striking about the court's reasoning is that, after it holds
that the Board is in good faith compliance and that discrimination has
been eliminated "to the extent practicable," the court then tries to salvage
a conception of local control that has been significantly diluted by the
opinion itself.1 °5 This is a tension in the decision because it affirms the
liberal individualist concept of choice against the collective political will
of the community. It should be noted, however, that the court stated
quite definitively that "voluntary maintenance of the desegregated school
system should be considered a compelling interest."'10 6 This is an explicit
acknowledgement that the political process is best suited to assess the
needs of its constituents. Professor Deborah N. Archer notes that this
compelling interest is supported by Supreme Court precedent:
These cases implicate several rationales for preservation of local
control. First, they acknowledge the value of allowing the political
process to determine how the needs of individual children within
each school district are best met. Furthermore, local control also
serves to encourage "experimentation, innovation, and a healthy
competition for educational excellence," and public confidence in the
school system generally. Frequently, the Court has acknowledged
the value of local control because of its view that federal judges
should not make pedagogical decisions within the purview of
educators and school boards. Notably, based on this theory of local
control, the Supreme Court in Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins paved
the way for findings of unitary status despite its recognition of large
racial disparities in each of those cases.... It would be ironic if the
importance of local control could be invoked to insulate school
officials from any legal obligation to address racial disparities within
their systems, while well-intentioned unitary school districts, acting
in good faith, were not afforded the same discretion necessary to
implement and maintain policies that would prevent a return to the
kinds of racially isolated conditions that first led the Supreme Court
point for his literal colorblind approach. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1-Meredith v. Jefferson County. Bd. of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2753-54 (2007).
104. This issue is resolved in McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F.
Supp.2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2004), afffd., 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub.
nom Meredith v. Jefferson County. Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006).
105. Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Ed., 102 F. Supp.2d at 376-77.
106. Hampton, 102 F. Supp.2d at 379.
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to reach its conclusion in Brown. 1
07
While the Hampton court, at the end of its decision, acknowledged
the significance of local autonomy,10 8 it nevertheless adopted the unitary
status analysis of the Supreme Court. Specifically, the Dowell-Freeman-
Jenkins'0 9 line of decisions stand for the proposition that federal court
supervision is temporary and that local control should be returned as
soon as practicable, even if there are substantial lingering vestiges of
discrimination."10  This analysis misses the systemic nature of
discrimination, and it undercuts race-conscious remedial initiatives by
school authorities because such efforts will be subject to strict scrutiny.
It should be possible to distinguish invidious discrimination from
positive, race-conscious remedial efforts to eradicate the present day
effects of past discrimination.''' This is the only way to preserve local
control so that it is meaningful." 2 Ironically, despite its unitary status
analysis, the court acknowledges:
The history and purposes of public school desegregation are ill-
served if courts make the concept of local control a one-way street to
neighborhood schools. Cohering to the long history of desegregation
efforts designed by Brown, Green, and Swann, voluntary
maintenance of the desegregated school system should be considered
a compelling state interest....
It is incongruous that a federal court could at one moment require a
school board to use race to prevent resegregation of the system, and
at the very next moment prohibit that same policy. 1
3
While Hampton proceeded vertically, in terms of burdens and
benefits imposed on African-American students, McFarland is a
horizontal case. The choice in McFarland was between schools with the
107. Hampton, 102 F. Supp.2d at 379-80; Deborah N. Archer, Moving Beyond Strict
Scrutiny: The Need for a More Nuanced Standard of Equal Protection Analysis for K
Through 12 Integration Programs, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 629, 642 (2007) (emphasis
added).
108. Hampton, 102 F. Supp.2d at 379-80.
109. See supra note 8.
110. Id.; see Parker, supra note 9, at 1645.
111. See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, Symposium, Equal Protection After the
Rational Basis Era: Is it Time to Reassess the Current Standards of Review?, 4 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 260 (2002); Goodwin Liu, Essay, Seattle and Louisville, 95 CAL. L. REV. 277,
306 (2007) (arguing that, upon a showing that "a lesser, nonpredominant use of race
would result in substantial resegregation," school boards should be permitted to continue
their voluntary use of race "as a predominant factor to maintain integrated schools.").
Professor Liu refers to this as the "anti-backsliding principle." Id.
112. See, e.g., Hampton, 102 F. Supp.2d at 379.
113. Id. Unfortunately, this is precisely what the Court did in Parents Involved-
Meredith.
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same basic educational offerings.1 14  Thus, the issue here is purely
neighborhood schools-the McFarland court affirmed the concept of
local control on a number of thematic levels.' 15 The court could very
well have come out the same way in Hampton if it had adopted a
deferential approach to local control and rejected the narrow,
individualized conception of discriminatory injury it articulated in
Hampton.
The Hampton decision to dissolve the desegregation decree was
momentous for the entire community. The district court invalidated the
student assignment plan for magnet schools, such as Central High
School, but retained the plan for the rest of the district.1 16 The decision
satisfies all of the interests in the litigation. African-Americn parents are
assured admission for their children to the neighborhood high school,
avoiding the perceived harms from the assignment system, and the
School Board is permitted to use its existing assignment plan for all non-
magnet schools in the system. One member of CEASE stated that the
decision was an "affirmation of our blackness. ... This says black
people are not inherently inferior."'1 17 A local news report noted the
unpredictable future "[a]fter 25 years of sweat, disruption and turmoil
over the racial composition of Jefferson County's schools ....
Uncertainty followed the dissolution of the desegregation decree.
Clearly, future litigation was likely." 9 The environment in which the
Hampton lawsuit arose-the pursuit of individualism using the vehicle of
colorblindness to challenge the district's student assignment plan-also
placed liberal, mostly white, elites counterpoised to a vocal element of
the local community. The U.S. district court dissolution of the
desegregation decree in 2000 was the first public battle.
Louisville's unique situation involving a broader community
supporting integration and a vocal minority of the African-American
community opposed to integration using busing was highlighted in an
114. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp.2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2004),
aff'd.,416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub. nom Meredith v. Jefferson County.
Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006); see supra note 98 and accompanying text.
115. Id. at 851-62 (adopting a deferential standard to conclude that the Board had a
compelling interest in maintaining integrated schools and that its student assignment plan
was narrowly tailored with the exception of the traditional schools).
116. Hampton, 102 F. Supp.2d at 379-82.
117. Chris Poynter, School Desegregation: Court Decree Dissolved, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), June 21, 2000, at A8.
118. Jim Adams, School Decree Dissolved; Order Creates Uncertainty for Jefferson
District, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), June 21, 2000, at Al.
119. Id. (One observer commented that "as long as everybody's happy with the plan,
that's fine. But if somebody challenges it, then the [Jefferson County school] board is
going to have to come up with a compelling reason for it.").
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editorial shortly after the Hampton decision. 120  It referred to the
"community's long period of sacrifice to attain desegregated schools"
which were recognized as one of the most successful integrated systems
in the country. 12  After noting that the Hampton case was the first
lawsuit filed by African-American parents to end a desegregation decree,
the editorial also states:
We have wondered all along whether some of those behind the
Central suit have a realistic view of what could happen if the
historically black high school were to become mostly black again.
The fatuous assumption that re-segregation will solve academic as
well as societal problems does a disservice to children of all races. 122
The School Board, after Hampton, signaled its continued support
for integration efforts. After the district court ruling, the Chairman of the
School Board, who was described in the news report as an initial
opponent of busing, noted that segregated residential housing patterns in
Louisville would limit diversity under a neighborhood school model.
123
She noted that residential segregation makes it necessary to use racial
guidelines and busing to integrate the county schools. 24 Another board
member expressed her uneasiness about the possibility of future
lawsuits. 125
A revised assignment plan was adopted for magnet schools after the
School Board gathered input from the local community. 126  Again,
community participants, primarily parents, pursued a model focused on
individualism "to provide an equal education for every student at all
schools." 127 This opposition to integration was linked to the perceived




123. Holly Coryell & Mark Schaver, Central Rule Poses Challenges for Board,
COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), June 26, 2000, at Al (statement of Carol Ann Haddad,
Chairman of Board and member since 1976 and the issuance of the desegregation decree:
"I wish the demographics had changed over these 25 years, but it [busing] would change
housing patterns, that people would move to be close to their schools[.]").
124. Id.
125. Id. (Statement of Board Member Priddy: "I just feel like we're waiting for that
other shoe to fall, until somebody else decides they want to go to court, too.").
126. See Holly Coryell, Look Beyond Race, Speakers Tell Schools, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), Mar. 20, 2001, at 3 [hereinafter Coryell, Beyond Race]. The district
held five public forums throughout the county, and conducted a survey using the Internet,
telephone calls, and printed forms. Holly Coryell, Survey Seeks Aid on Student
Assignments, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 26, 2000, at 1. The public response in
these forums, according to local news reports, focused on measures unrelated to
integration using busing. See, e.g., Holly Coryell, Forum-Goers Want Diversity, but No
Quotas, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 27, 2000, at 1.
127. Coryell, Beyond Race, supra note 126.
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failure to improve educational achievement for African-American
children in the school district.
12 8
B. The Second Case-McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schools
129
Only two years after the Hampton decision dissolving the
desegregation decree, David McFarland, a white parent, challenged the
rejection of his two sons from "traditional" schools because of racial and
gender guidelines.' 30  Traditional elementary, middle and high schools
represent one of the many choices for parents in the Jefferson County
school district and emphasize textbook-based instruction, discipline,
morality and parent involvement. 131 Nineteen traditional schools exist in
the system. 132  The local attorney representing McFarland also
represented the CEASE group who successfully sued to dissolve the
desegregation decree in Hampton.'33  The key contention made by
McFarland was that the use of race or gender to deny admissions is
unconstitutional in every respect. 1
34
Again, the argument against the student assignment policy focused
on the denial of an "equal education" if a student could not attend a
traditional school. 35 McFarland contended that the traditional schools,
like the magnet schools in Hampton, were limited-availability special
programs that could not be offered using race as a factor.1 36 McFarland's
attorney argued that "there is no compelling reason to continue to use
what he says are quotas because racial achievement gaps and some
school's academic shortcomings show that diversity hasn't provided
promised benefits."'137  The school district countered that the racial
guidelines do not interfere with the choice of most parents and have only
128. See id. ("Grandparent Tom Moffett said it's time for the board to emphasize
education over desegregation, which he said has failed to improve educational
achievement for black children.").
129. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp.2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2004),
aff'd., 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom. Meredith v. Jefferson County
Bd. of Educ., 547 U.S. 1178 (2006) (Meredith joined a pending lawsuit; the other
underlying issues relating to McFarland were no longer at issue when the case ultimately
reached the United States Supreme Court.).
130. Chris Kenning, Jefferson Schools' Quotas Challenged, COURIER-J. (Louisville,





135. Chris Kenning, Desegregation Policy Defended, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.),
Dec. 10, 2003, at 1 [hereinafter Kenning, Policy Defended].
136. Id. (Another rationale for the suit was the special benefit provided by traditional
schools because the students in traditional schools perform better on state tests.).
137. Id.
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a minimal impact.138 Further, the district argued that students denied
admission to traditional programs were not harmed because other schools
offered a similar curriculum and "traditional schools are only perceived
as being different or better."
' 139
The problem with the assignment system for McFarland was the
limited seats available in the traditional schools. 140 The challenge to the
racial guidelines for enrollment asserted a wider problem with the
assignment system. McFarland borrowed an issue from the Hampton
case and contended that this larger problem of integration was not
achieving any educational benefits for any students in the system.
141
When Crystal Meredith joined as a plaintiff, a local attorney was quoted
in the local newspaper: "We want no racial quotas in schools, period.'
142
It was assumed this change would guarantee admission of all students to
their neighborhood schools.
The pressure to change the district's policy was constant and
unwavering. When the district court judge stayed the proceedings to
wait for the Supreme Court's decisions in the Grutter
143 and Gratz14 4
cases, the plaintiffs pressed for an immediate change in the assignment
system for the upcoming 2003-04 school year. 45  A motion for an
injunction was filed to require immediate student reassignment to
"neighborhood schools with open enrollment" and admission to the
traditional schools regardless of race. 1
46
The district court denied the motion in July 2003 because of the
extreme disruption that would occur among the 152 schools within the
district if new student assignments, bus routes, budgets, and teacher
assignments were required. 47 After the Supreme Court's decisions in
the Grutter and Gratz cases in June 2003, the district court proceeded
with the lawsuit challenging the Jefferson County student assignment
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Kenning, Quotas Challenged, supra note 130.
141. Kenning, Policy Defended, supra note 135.
142. Chris Kenning, Racial Guideline Suit May Add Voice, COURIER-J. (Louisville,
Ky.), Apr. 16, 2003, at 1. The school board chairman's thoughts also were reported that
she "has warned that abandoning the integration plan could lead to resegregation of
schools." Id.
143. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
144. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
145. Chris Kenning, Motion Would Halt Use of Race in Pupil Assignment, COURIER-
J. (Louisville, Ky.), May 29, 2003, at 1.
146. Id.
147. Chris Kenning, Judge Denies Bid to End School Race Policy, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), July 22, 2003, at 1. The school district's attorney expressed relief for
the 96,000 children in the school system and their parents. Id. Meredith's attorney
expressed disappointment that the children would not enroll in neighborhood schools. Id.
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policy.
148
In its decision, the district court embraced the local control
rationale, and held that the JCPS met the compelling state interest
requirement because its reasons for integrating elementary and secondary
schools comported with the constitutional mandate of Grutter, 149 and that
the student assignment plan was narrowly tailored to achieve that
purpose.150  In McFarland, the parents of white students advanced a
discrimination claim alleging that they were denied admission to
neighborhood elementary schools on the basis of race. 1
5
What is striking about McFarland is that the court adopts a
deferential posture toward local control; and in doing so, the severity of
strict scrutiny analysis is lessened by the court's attention to context, the
legacy of Brown, and broad-based community support for integrated
schools in Jefferson County. 152  The fact that school integration was
voluntarily continued by a democratically elected school board fit
squarely within the constitutional mandate of Brown and the Court's
desegregation jurisprudence that emphasized the concept of local
control. 153  Noting that "[t]he historical importance of the deference
accorded to local school boards goes to the very heart of our democratic
form of government,"'' 54 the court placed voluntary school integration at
the very core of the Supreme Court's desegregation jurisprudence:
Viewing voluntary school integration as an extension of the Supreme
Court's school desegregation jurisprudence makes sense.... As
many school systems escape the mandate of desegregation decrees,
they face for the first time a choice of direction. It would seem rather
odd that the concepts of equal protection, local control and limited
deference are now only one-way streets to a particular educational
policy, virtually prohibiting the voluntary continuation of policies
148. See id.
149. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp.2d 834, 849-55 (W.D.
Ky. 2004), aff'd., 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub noma. Meredith v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 547 U.S. 1178 (2006).
150. See id. at 855-61. The court held that the assignment process for traditional
schools was not narrowly tailored because it placed Black and White applicants on
separate assignment tracks, and a race-based tracking system was unnecessary to
accomplish the Board's goal of integrated schools. Id. at 862-64.
151. Id. at 838 n.3, 844 n.15. The 2001 Student Assignment Plan was based upon
choice around three organizing principles: "management of broad racial guidelines"
(fifteen to fifty-percent Black student enrollment); creation of "resides" areas and
clusters; and "maximization of student choice through magnet schools, magnet traditional
schools, magnet and optional programs, open enrollment and transfers." Id. at 842. This
managed choice plan used race as a "plus" factor, but not to the exclusion of other
relevant factors.
152. Id. at 849-50.
153. See id. at 851.
154. Id. at 850.
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once required by law.1
55
The court's reference to "limited deference" notes the conceptual
difference between the First Amendment based deference underlying
Grutter and Bakke156 and the deference accorded to local school boards.
While "[t]he historical importance of the deference accorded to local
school boards goes to the very heart of our democratic form of
government,"' 157 in the local secondary schools context, such deference is
limited to the Board's "acknowledged responsibilities and complements
the basic concepts of democracy."'158  Unlike the university context,
where the concern is with the exchange of ideas in the classroom
marketplace, the concern here is with the permissible boundaries of local
power when school boards voluntarily use race, as one of many factors,
to maintain substantively integrated schools.
While local control was somewhat of an afterthought in Hampton,
in McFarland the concept of local control is employed to advance a
theory of integration that is rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment's anti-
caste and anti-subordination principles. 159  "Brown and its progeny
established a moral imperative to eradicate racial injustice in the public
schools."' 160 In McFarland, individual rights do not tip the scale the way
they did in Hampton-this is so because the "burdens" and "benefits"
here are distributed horizontally, so any displacement does not seem to
have the "invidious" effect of excluding access to unique, or special,
resources on the basis of race. There is "one community of roughly
equal schools.''
The McFarland court noted that the political community embraced
Brown's moral and constitutional underpinnings as mainstream
American values. 162 Education is a pluralistic value extending beyond
the rudiments of the "three-Rs"1 63 -- diversity has substantive benefits
155. Id. at 851.
156. Id. at 850 n.31 (citations omitted) ("Justice Powell first expressed the idea that a
university's right to determine its own student body was accorded some special
consideration under the First Amendment.... In Grutter, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the idea that academic freedom grounded in the First Amendment supported some
deference to the university. In the different context of public school education, that
concept of deference is not relevant here.").
157. Id. at 850.
158. Id. at 851.
159. See Hutchinson, supra note 4, at 615, 622-23.
160. McFarland, 330 F. Supp.2d at 852 (quoting Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 102 F. Supp.2d 358, 379 (W.D. Ky. 2000)).
161. Id. at 854.
162. Id. at 852.
163. Id. "The fundamentals taught in elementary school; esp: reading, writing
["riting"], and arithmetic ["rithmetic"]." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1229 (Merriam-Webster 1989).
[Vol. 112:4
THE RHETORIC OF COLORBLIND CONSTITUTIONALISM
that accrue to all in the community.' 64  These substantive benefits
underscore the fact that the Board has a "compelling interest in
maintaining racially integrated schools."'
' 65
The court went on to hold that the 2001 Plan was narrowly tailored
as well: 166 there were no unconstitutional quotas because the fifteen to
fifty-percent racial guidelines were flexible and produced a broad target
range of populations within the schools; 167 there was individualized
review of student applicants; 68 and race neutral alternatives were
considered along with the limited use of race to preserve integrated
schools. 169 On every doctrinal level, McFarland explicitly embraced the
concept of local control. This is why the assignment plan passed
constitutional muster in all respects, with the exception of the traditional
school assignment process. Throughout the opinion, the court noted that
the community had bought into the process-this was no longer a system
of compulsion imposed by a federal court because the system had
malfunctioned; rather, this was a voluntary effort by the representative
body of the community to preserve the vibrant diversity that was the
hallmark of the Jefferson County school system.170  The United States
Supreme Court, however, would soon short-circuit the will of the
political community and set the course for resegregation.
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to examine all of the
doctrinal contours of the Court's decision in Parents Involved-Meredith,
164. Id. at 853 (the benefits of cross-racial understanding and racial tolerance,
preparation for life in a pluralistic society, and development of future leaders are all
rooted in the Grutter conception of diversity). "Like institutions of higher education,
elementary and secondary schools are 'pivotal to sustaining our political and cultural
heritage' with a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of society." Id. at 852-53.
(citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003)).
165. Id. at 855.
166. See id. at 855. In reaching the question that was left unresolved in Hampton, see
id. at 841, the court held that the use of race in the assignment system of traditional
schools was unconstitutional, see id. at 862-64. Traditional schools offer a
comprehensive curriculum and a "highly structured educational environment." Id. at 846.
Applicants to traditional schools were placed on four lists separated by race and gender.
See id. at 847. This evaluation process did not allow for individual, holistic review and
was unconstitutional. See id. at 862-64. "The assignment process insulates one group of
applicants from the randomness of choice and 'competition' with other applicants. The
use of categories, therefore, makes race the 'defining feature' rather than merely the
'tipping' factor." Id. at 863.
167. Id. at 856-58.
168. Id. at 858-59.
169. Id. at 861-62.
170. It is particularly compelling in this regard to note that even a representation-
reinforcement theorist like John Hart Ely would agree with this proposition. "In a
representative democracy value determinations are to be made by our elected
representatives, and if in fact most of us disapprove we can vote them out of office."
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 103 (1980).
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it is important to underscore the anti-democratic nature of the decision.
In a 5-4 plurality opinion, the Court struck down both voluntary school
integration plans in Seattle and Louisville:
17 1
The Court has consistently premised its holdings, particularly in later
school desegregation cases, on the concept of local control of
schools. The decision in Parents Involved-Meredith represents a
seminal doctrinal shift-the Court rejected the collective decisions of
the political communities of Louisville and Seattle and concluded
that race was employed unconstitutionally in both desegregation
plans.
172
This is not merely disturbing, it is anti-democratic:
Professor Girardeau Spann posits that the very legitimacy of the
Court itself is undermined when it intervenes in the political process
to overturn valid decisional outcomes. Specifically, the Court has
disintegrated substantive approaches to the eradication of segregated
schools and constitutionalized resegregation. Rejecting the Court's
disintegration of valid integration programs and its
constitutionalization of resegregation, Professor Spann argues that
"[t]here is no credible argument that either the text or the original
intent of the Constitution requires the Supreme Court to invalidate
integration programs that are voluntarily adopted by politically
accountable, white majoritarian, government policymaking officials."
The Court inverts the racial politics rationale by ignoring the fact that
the majoritarian political communities of Louisville and Seattle
voluntarily adopted substantive integration plans designed to address
the present day effects of past discrimination. Essentially, both
communities voted against resegregation. The Court casts this vote
aside.'
73
From a communitarian perspective, judicial review here is
illegitimate. 174  With breathtaking cynicism, the Court concludes that
since there is no identifiable discrimination in Louisville, 175 the only
ground upon which the integration plan can be sustained is on the ground
171. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I-Meredith v. Jefferson
County. Bd. of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 2768 (2007) ("The way to stop discrimination on the
basis of race is to stop discriminating in the basis of race.").
172. Cedric Merlin Powell, Symposium, The Future of School Integration in America:
A Symposium Summary, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
173. Id. (citations omitted).
174. Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING
EDGE 21, 27 (2nd ed. 2000) (noting that minorities should forego the judicial process
because it is skewed to protect majority over minority interests (the counter-majoritarian
failure) and pursue social change through the political process).
175. Parents Involved-Meredith, 127 S. Ct. at 2752-53.
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of diversity. 76  This ground is unsustainable because Grutter is
inapplicable to the elementary and secondary school context, and
diversity was defined so narrowly-as either "Black" or "White"-that
race certainly predominated in the plan. 77  Thus, there was no
compelling state interest and the plan was not narrowly tailored because
it was a racial balancing quota.1
78
III. Public Opinion Today-2007-2008 Notes from the Ground
The news reports immediately after the Supreme Court's decision in
the Parents Involved-Meredith case discussed the pace of change in the
student assignment system. 179 A new Superintendent of the Jefferson
County School system assumed the office on July 1, 2007, just days after
the decision.' 80 Superintendent Sheldon Berman was quoted as saying:
"This community really values an integrated school system. It is a core
value within Jefferson County ... [w]e will continue to find some
creative ways to continue to model that."
' '8
The pressure to revamp the entire student assignment system and
move to a neighborhood school model was instantaneous. Days after the
Supreme Court's decision, Meredith's attorney "threatened ... to take
the district to court again unless it adopts a race-neutral plan for the
coming school year."'' 82 District officials reported it would be impossible
to do this because students were already assigned and school would
begin in a mere 45 days.
183
Some of the voices reported in the local news were in favor of
continued emphasis on diversity. 184 Jefferson County district officials
noted the possibility of considering race in student assignments as well
as other factors such as test scores and family income. 185 The president
of the Jefferson County Parent Teacher Association expressed the hope
that any alternative student assignment plan would preserve diversity
because "Our neighborhoods are not integrated .... Until they are...
the school systems should be integrated."'
' 86
176. Id. at 2753.
177. Id. at 2753-54.
178. Id. at 2755-59.
179. Nancy Rodriguez, Supreme Court Desegregation Decision; Plaintiffs: Act Now






185. Chris Kenning, Supreme Court Desegregation Decision; 5-4 Ruling Limits Use
of Race by District, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), June 29, 2007, at IK.
186. Id.
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Meredith and her attorney spoke in favor of the Court's ruling. 87 In
addition, several local civil rights activists and religious leaders in the
African-American community favored the decision. 88 The division of
the African-American community, however, was again revealed by the
news reports after the decision. As one African-American community
activist noted, "I applauded the (desegregation) decision decades ago, but
it was an experience that I believe did more damage to our children than
to help our children."' 189 A local religious leader noted the decision
forces "the civil rights community [in the city] to look at some of those
older methods and some new methods about achieving equal access." 190
Other civil rights activists expressed concern about the Court's decision.
Raoul Cunningham, current President of the Louisville branch of the
NAACP, noted his support for "a plan that will ensure quality education
for all students with as much diversity as we possibly can.'191
After the Supreme Court's decision, the school district, under the
scrutiny of the public and under the leadership of a new superintendent,
considered options to comply with the Supreme Court's ruling. Three
weeks later, the Jefferson County Board of Education voted unanimously
to develop a new student assignment policy to become effective in the
2009-10 school year. 192 On July 23, 2007, the Board also voted to accept
new or transfer students throughout the school system without reference
to the race of the student.
193
A. A Continued Threat ofLitigation
The continued insistence that only one student assignment policy
would comply with the Parents Involved-Meredith decision also began
within weeks of the Supreme Court's decision. Two weeks before the
beginning of the school year, and a few days after the board's vote on
July 23, 2007, Meredith's attorney filed a motion for a contempt ruling
because of the board's decision to delay implementation of a new
assignment plan until the 2009-10 school year. 194 The motion requested
an order that the student assignment plan be immediately abandoned, that
187. Id. at http://www.courierjournal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID= /20070629/
NEWSO1/70629003/0/NEWSOI (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. This comment was attributed to the wrong person in the original article. The
next day's paper stated the author of the comment was Phillip Bailey, a local writer. See
June 30, 2007 Corrections to article.
191. Id.
192. BUSINESS FIRST (Louisville, Ky.) 7/30/07, 2007 WLNR 14594633.
193. Id.
194. Lawyer Still Seeks Hearing in JCPS Case, BUSINESS FIRST (Louisville, Ky.), July
30, 2007.
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transfers be granted to 2,800 students, and that a contempt ruling against
school administrators and members of the school board be entered
because of their failure to comply with the Supreme Court's ruling in the
Parents Involved-Meredith case. 195 The District Court judge denied the
motion stating the "[d]efendants need not respond to such an outrageous
motion, couched in such unprofessional language."'
' 96
Days later, Meredith's attorney filed another motion to force the
school district to provide enrollment data in order to ensure that 2,800
children who were denied transfers were not denied based on race.,
97
The attorney reported that he "received 'hundreds of calls' from parents
who want to transfer students from assigned schools but have not been
able to because some schools are at capacity."'
98
Finally, in late September 2007, Meredith's attorney filed another
suit in federal district court alleging that Jefferson County school
district's teacher assignment policy uses a "discriminatory quota" in
initial hiring and transfers that applies only to African-American
teachers. 199 The client, an African-American teacher, was denied a
transfer to an elementary school closer to her home. 20 0  The school
district reported that it uses multiple factors in staffing and transferring
employees including employee preference and seniority.
20 1
B. The Proposed Student Assignment Plan-2008
The district revealed two proposals for the new student assignment
195. Id.
196. Judge Denies Request for Contempt Ruling, THE KENTUCKY POST, July 28, 2007,
at A10. The district judge's order further stated that "The court has every intention of
thoroughly considering the legitimate concerns of both sides raised in a civil and
appropriate manner. ... Unfortunately, the motion most recently filed falls far short of
these last two basic requirements." Id.
197. See id.
198. Hearing Requested, THE KENTUCKY POST, July 31, 2007, at A6. The attorney
said he "received 'hundreds of calls' from parents who want to transfer students from
assigned schools but have not been able to because some schools are at capacity." Id.
School officials reported that the district used a policy that allows "students to transfer
away from their assigned schools, regardless of their race." Id.
199. See Ben Adkins, Teacher Files Race Lawsuit Against JCPS, BUSINESS FIRST
(Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 26, 2007. The suit claims that the "Singleton Ratio" is used to
divide the number of African-American teachers at a given instructional level
(elementary, middle or high school) by the total number of teachers at that level. Id. The
lawsuit claims the ratio is applied to all schools in the district and limits schools to having
no more than fifteen-percent of teachers who are African-American. See id.
200. Id.
201. See id. A district official discussed the district's ratio guideline to have African-
American teachers in its schools in a range of 11.9-21.9 percent at the elementary level,
10.9-20.9 percent at the middle school level and 6.8-16.8 percent at the high school level.
See id.
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plan on January 28, 2008.202 The current student assignment plan for
Jefferson County divides the district into twelve clusters and permits
parents to make two choices for a preferred elementary school. 203 The
clusters include schools located throughout the district.20 4 A parent also
205may apply for a transfer to a school outside of the cluster.
The two proposed student assignment plans each include -two
different mechanisms to assess the school district.20 6 One mechanism
focuses on the population of the school district, and the second
mechanism focuses on the available schools. 20 7 The first mechanism
involves an assessment of the entire district using three measures: district
average income level; district average education level of adults; and
district average percentage of minority students.20 8  The second
mechanism is based on the school cluster concept linking schools from
across the district, and offers two different approaches.20 9
The assessment of income, education and minority population
creates two distinct neighborhood groups.2  Area A includes those
neighborhoods of families with below the average income level, below
the average education level, and a minority student population above the
district average.2 1 Similarly, Area B includes those neighborhoods with
families above the average income level, above the average education
level, and below the average minority sfudent population.212 The models
are based on geography within the district and the interest of preserving
racial, ethnic and socio-economic status diversity for the 98,000 student
202. Understanding the Desegregation Maps, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 29,
2008.
203. Id.
204. See Antoinette Konz and Chris Kenning, Desegregation: The New Proposal;
Jefferson Schools Unveil Plan to Keep Diversity, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 29,
2008, at IA. See also Understanding the Desegregation Maps, COUMER-J. (Louisville,
Ky.), Jan. 29, 2008, available at http://www.courier-joumal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
Date=20080128&Category=NEWS01 &ArtNo=80128033&SectionCat=&Template=print
art.







211. In 2004, the median household income in Jefferson County was $42,239.00
according to the Kentucky State Data Center, available at http://ksdc.louisville.edu. The
school district's calculations are based on the average household income in Jefferson
County of $4 1,000 and an average education level of adults (twenty-five years and older)
as equivalent to a high school degree and some college. Understanding the
Desegregation Maps, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 29, 2008.
212. Understanding the Desegregation Maps, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 29,
2008.
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district.213
Each of the proposed student assignment plans are based on
elementary school clusters.21 4 One cluster proposal is similar to the
existing clusters that link schools across the entire district.215  The
alternative cluster proposal links schools in contiguous neighborhoods.
216
Both cluster proposals assign students from Areas A and B. 217  Both
proposals maintain school choice, encourage the development of magnet
programs and schools to promote diversity, and attempt to limit the
number of elementary school transfers ranging from 3,500 to 1,700.218
The proposed student assignment plan was the subject of numerous
news reports in January 2008. School district officials were reported to
be "[d]etermined to avoid resegregation" and "spent months weighing
options., 219 The local news reported the long hours and careful study
going into the development of the student assignment proposals.220 The
district's proposal was bolstered by the assistance of "experts," including
Professor john a. powell of Ohio State University and Gary Orfield of
U.C.L.A., who is named as "one of the country's top desegregation
academics. ' 221 District administrators and lawyers were reported to have
considered many options for a new student assignment plan, including
assignment to neighborhood schools, open enrollment, a lottery system
or adopting factors such as income and geography to assign students.222
There was very limited parent participation at this beginning stage of
developing the proposal.
Again, Meredith's attorney pressed for immediate change, almost
without reflection. Before the publication of the new student assignment
proposals, Meredith's attorney was reported to say, "he'll be watching
for any improper use of race or factors that are simply 'a guise' for







219. Chris Kenning, District Ready to Unveil Student Assignment Plans, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 27, 2008, at IA.
220. See id.
221. Chris Kenning, Desegregation: The New Proposal; How the Plan Was
Developed; District Consulted National Experts, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 29,
2008, at 8A.
222. Id. Numerous other individuals were consulted as the district formulated its
assignment proposals including: a "self-selected group" of district principals and officials
from other school systems in Cambridge, Massachusetts; Charlotte, North Carolina;
Berkeley, California; and Wake County, North Carolina. Id.
223. Chris Kenning, District Ready to Unveil Student Assignment Plans, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 27, 2008, at IA.
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Meredith's attorney stated, "[o]n the surface, without seeing a detailed
review of the JSCPS proposed plan, this new student assignment seems
unconstitutional. 224
The School Board also adopted an interim student assignment plan
for the 2008-09 school year that borrows heavily from the proposed
permanent plan. The interim plan would rely on geography and ensure
that elementary schools draw fifteen to fifty-percent of their enrollment
from areas with minority populations of at least forty-five-percent. 2 5
The district would use this interim policy for children entering first
grade, new students to the district and all students requesting transfers.
Less than one week after the interim student assignment plan was
adopted by the School Board, Meredith's attorney filed a motion in the
U.S. District Court for a status conference to review the temporary plan
adopted for the 2008-09 academic year to "determine whether Jefferson
County Public Schools has revived 'a quota system' and is 'assigning
kindergartners and first-graders to elementary schools based on racial
classifications.' 2 26  The school district's lawyer explained in a news
report that the plan uses race as one factor in student assignments and it
is not applied directly to individual students.227
One of the parents in CEASE from the Hampton case had a
prominent role in the press coverage of the new assignment proposals.
She is quoted as favoring neighborhood schools.228 She expressed
concern about the long bus rides that African-American students would
face under the proposals and said, "It sounds like they took what we had
and gave it another name. 229 Community forums have been held in
224. Antoinette Konz & Chris Kenning, Desegregation: The New Proposal; Jefferson
Schools Unveil Plan to Keep Diversity, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 29, 2008, at
IA.
225. Antoinette Konz & Chris Kenning, Temporary Desegregation Plan Approved,
COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Feb. 1, 2008, at IA.
226. Chris Kenning, Schools' Interim Policy Opposed, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.),
Feb. 6, 2008, at 1B.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Chris Kenning, Desegregation: The New Proposal; Jefferson Schools Unveil
Plan to Keep Diversity, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 27, 2008, at IA. Another
criticism from this same parent was included in the local paper as a "local reaction to
desegregation" where she states, "You're still putting kids on buses, whether you call
them African-American or 'Area A' children." Id. Another local civil rights activist also
was critical and said "I would rather focus on achievement." Id. Other reported local
reactions were favorable, including those from the President of the Louisville Chapter of
the NAACP ("We are very happy that diversity has been maintained."), the city's mayor,
director of the Jefferson County Teachers Association ("I think they've taken a lemon
and made some pretty good lemonade."), and a local school principal ("I think either plan
is fair in giving parents a choice. I think it is extremely crucial to maintain diverse
schools"). Id.
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February and March 2008.230 One ongoing issue continues to arise:
whether the community must choose between a plan to promote diversity
or one that promotes quality education. 23' The fact that this is a false
choice has been emphasized; quality schools are enhanced by an
integrated environment. 32
C. Community Involvement-The Broader Picture
Jefferson County's student assignment plans offer two options for
the community to consider. In addition, the plans exhibit a fundamental
shift in the district's assessment of diversity within the community. The
focus on socioeconomic status is a key change. The inclusion of the total
minority population within the district is another significant shift.
Historically, Louisville has been a binary community composed of
African-Americans and Whites.233  Today, the community is
experiencing substantial change in terms of its student and general
population.
The state of Kentucky and the Louisville/Jefferson County
metropolitan area are unique in several demographic measurements. In
nearly every demographic category related to race and ethnicity, the
population in Kentucky varies substantially from the national
234averages. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2006, the white
population of Kentucky is 90.2 percent of the population compared to the
national average of 80.1 percent.235 Blacks in Kentucky represent 7.5
percent of the population compared with 12.8 percent nationally.
2 36
Latinos are two-percent of Kentucky's population compared with 14.8
percent nationally.237  Asians represent one-percent of Kentucky's
230. Id.
231. Antoinette Konz & Chris Kenning, Reaction to Desegregation Plan Mixed,
COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Feb. 24, 2008, at lB. See also Antoinette Konz & Chris
Kenning, Shift Could Affect 3,500 Students, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Feb. 24, 2008.
232. Antoinette Konz & Chris Kenning, Desegregation: The New Proposal, Jefferson
Schools Unveil Plan to Keep Diversity, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 29, 2008, at
1 A. See also Antoinette Konz & Chris Kenning, Reaction to Desegregation Plan Mixed,
COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Feb. 24, 2008, at lB.
233. See IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
(10th Anniversary ed., N.Y.U. Press 2006) (1996).
234. The percentages of Kentuckians reporting themselves to be two or more races is
one-percent which is close to the national average of 1.6% of the population. See
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21000.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Asians are one-percent of Kentucky's population compared with 4.4%
nationally; American Indian and Alaska Natives are 0.2% compared with one-percent
nationally; Foreign born represent two-percent of the Kentucky population compared
with 11. 1% nationally; and the percentage of persons over five years of age who speak a
language other than English at home in Kentucky is 3.9% compared with 17.9%
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238population compared with a national average of 4.4 percent.
The population of Louisville/Jefferson County metropolitan area is
very different from the rest of the state. The county is comprised of
many smaller cities, including the City of Louisville. A formal merger of
the City of Louisville and Jefferson County occurred in January 2003 .239
Demographic data often is recorded for both the City of Louisville and
Jefferson County. The Louisville data illustrates the racial diversity of
the metropolitan area compared with the rest of the state. Based on the
2003 Census estimate data, in the City of Louisville with its total
population of nearly 248,762, Blacks represent thirty-three-percent of the
city's population compared with the statewide 7.3 percent.240 Whites are
62.9 percent of the Louisville population compared with 90.1 percent of
241Kentucky as a whole. Latinos represent 1.9 percent of the total
population in Louisville, but only 1.5 percent of the total Kentucky
population.242
The population data for all of Louisville/Jefferson County is
approximately 701,500 and this area includes the City of Louisville and
many other smaller cities or neighborhoods.243 Blacks represent 20.2
percent of the county's population, and Latinos represent 2.6% of the
total population.244 Whites account for 76.4 percent of the population in
the county.245
The Louisville/Jefferson County metropolitan area and the rest of
Kentucky have experienced a period of changing demographics similar
to other states in the Midwest: a rise in foreign-born residents. The
immigrant population in Kentucky more than doubled from 1990 to
2000, making Kentucky a state with one of the ten fastest growing
immigrant populations in the nation.246 The immigrant population in
nationally. See http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/210000.html.
238. Id.
239. On January 6, 2003, the City of Louisville merged with Jefferson County to
create a consolidated local government. www.louisvilleky.gov/YourGovemment/
Merger.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
240. See http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21/2148000.html (last visited Apr. 11,
2008).
241. Id.
242. In Louisville, foreign born persons represent 3.8% compared with the two-
percent Kentucky average; the percentage of persons over 5 who speak a language other
than English at home is 6.2% compared with a statewide average of 3.9%. See
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21/2148000.html.




246. URBAN INSTITUTE, A PROFILE OF THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE
METROPOLITAN LOUISVILLE AREA (2006), available at http://www.urban.org/
publications/411391.html.
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Louisville more than doubled as well, and immigrants are a major factor
in the population growth of the metropolitan area.247 Louisville differs
from many other cities in the Midwest and Southeast whose immigrant
population also grew rapidly over the past fifteen years in this way:
Louisville's immigration population is predominately refugees. 248 This
may or may not have an impact on community building.
An Urban Institute report has noted that the children of immigrants
are a fast-growing segment of the school-age population in the
metropolitan area.249  Further, the community has been cautioned to
recognize that immigrants may be unable or reluctant to advocate for
themselves and their children. 250 As a result, it has been suggested that
the school district must devise policies that address the needs of the
children of immigrants.25'
The children of immigrants are similar in terms of income to other
children in the Louisville/Jefferson County area. According to the Urban
Institute, the native and immigrant population eligible for free or reduced
lunch are nearly identical.252 This is unusual because nationally a higher
percentage of foreign-born children are low-income in most school
253districts. The reason for this similarity is due to the fact that
immigrants in Louisville differ in several respects from the national
trends. In Louisville, immigrants have a relatively high income and
education levels, in large part because a large percentage of immigrants
are refugees who come to the city through refugee resettlement
programs.254  Further, the higher poverty level for all Kentucky
247. Id. ("In 2004, the foreign-born population of the Louisville metro area was
53,000; this number is likely an underestimate, as Louisville's immigrants are
undercounted in official government surveys, according to local data experts. The 2004
figure represents a 93 percent increase in the foreign-born population since 2000, and a
388 percent increase since 1990. Nationally, the number of immigrants grew by 10
percent between 2000 and 2004 and by 73 percent between 1990 and 2004.").
248. Id.
249. URBAN INSTITUTE, A PROFILE OF THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE
METROPOLITAN LOUISVILLE AREA (2006); see also URBAN INSTITUTE, THE NEW
DEMOGRAPHY OF AMERICAS SCHOOLS, IMMIGRATION AND No CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT
(2005).
250. Id.
251. Id. (By 2000, immigrants represented one in nine of all U.S. residents, but their
children represented one in five of all children under age eighteen. Children of
immigrants represented an even higher share--one in four-of all school-age children
who were low-income, defined by eligibility for the National School Lunch Program.).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. URBAN INSTITUTE, A PROFILE OF THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE
METROPOLITAN LOUISVILLE AREA (2006) (In Louisville, low-income children, eligible for
free or reduced lunch, included thirty-six-percent of children of immigrants in K-12 and
thirty-three-percent of the children of Louisville natives. Nationally, forty-nine-percent of
children of immigrants were low-income, compared to thirty-two-percent of children of
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residents,255 including Louisville/Jefferson County residents, accounts
some of this difference.
This data suggests that the proposed student assignment plans based
on income levels will draw equally from the native and immigrant
populations. Further, the broader consideration of all non-white groups
in the diversity calculus will ensure that all immigrant and foreign born
students are included in the assignment system. A remaining challenge
for the Jefferson County school district is the adequacy of community
outreach to this group. It remains to be seen whether the open forums
and use of on-line and telephone surveys will be sufficient.
IV. Conclusion
The cases from Hampton to McFarland to Parents Involved-
Meredith offer scant hope in terms of courts being respective to positive,
race-conscious remedial efforts. Even when courts acknowledge the
local control rationale, it is hedged against claims of individual rights.256
While Hampton and McFarland come out differently, on some level,
they are the same case. What distinguishes them is how the individual
right is advanced in each case-in Hampton, African-Americans advance
a "colorblind" individual claim for neighborhood schools, and they
prevail because their exclusion is based on race and they are denied
access to something unique and non-fungible.25 7  Conversely, in
McFarland, the individual right is fungible because the educational
benefit is flat (horizontal)-everyone receives roughly the same
education and there is no constitutional right to attend a specific
neighborhood school.258
Perhaps the answer lies in our work on the ground; while courts
may not fully embrace local control when race is used, even as one of
many factors, there is still a strong argument for deference based upon
institutional expertise. Even in the cases where the Court has endorsed a
retreat from school desegregation litigation, there was the recognition
natives.).
255. Id.
256. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
257. Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp.2d 358, 380-82 (W.D.
Ky. 2000).
258. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp.2d 834, 860 (W.D. Ky.
2004).
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that institutions on the ground are the closest to the problem and are
intimately aware of the intricacies of its impact on affected
communities.259 This is where our work should begin.26°
259. Id. at 850 n.30.
260. See, e.g., Erica Frankenburg & Liliana M. Garces, Symposium, The Future of
School Integration in America, The Use of Social Science Evidence in Parents Involved
and Meredith: Implications for Researchers and Schools, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008).
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